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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The U.N. ,n East-West Confrontation 
ROBERT E. RIGGS* 
ABSTRACT - As an instrument of foreign policy, the United Nations performs three functions: 
it legitimizes particular national po'licies, it facilitates international negotiations, and it provides 
material support for policy by a'llocating manpower and other resources. In dealings with the 
Soviet bloc during the past two decades, the United States has used the United Nations pri-
marily to confer legitimacy on anti-communist policies. Since the mid- l 950's, however, the in-
creasing unreliability of U.N. majorities and improved Soviet-American relations have brought a 
relative de-emphasis of the legitimization function. Correspondingly, a somewhat enlarged U.N. 
role as a forum for East-West negotiations has emerged. Except for the Korean war, the material 
support function of the U.N. has not been significant in East-West relations. 
The United Nations performs three broad classes of 
functions as an instrument of national policy. It can fa-
cilitate diplomatic negotiation; it can confer international 
approval, and therefore legitimacy, upon the behavior 
and policies of states; and it can provide material sup-
port - in the form of personnel and other resources - to 
implement particular national policies. Of the three func-
tions - diplomacy, legitimization, and material support-
diplomacy is generally regarded as the central function 
of the United Nations and the chief justification for its 
existence. 
The day-to-day interchange that takes place among 
representatives to the United Nations has become an in-
valuable supplement to traditional diplomacy, while 
many negotiated agreements of considerable importance 
to the United States have emerged from the formal proc-
esses of the organization. The limitation of nuclear test-
ing, banning of nuclear weapons from outer space, and 
agreement on nuclear non-proliferation are all products 
- at least in part - of U.N. processes of debate and ne-
gotiation. Discovery and exploration in outer space, the 
promotion of human rights, trade and economic devel-
opment are other areas of interest to the United States 
in which agreements have been achieved. Still another 
aspect of the U.N. Negotiating function is the mediatorial 
service frequently performed by the Secretary-General 
and his associates in international disputes. 
Legitimization is a second function performed by the 
United Nations. As used here, the term refers to the at-
titudes of other governments toward the foreign policies 
of the United States. If other governments approve what 
we say or do, or at least acquiesce in it, our behavior has 
legitimacy. Under such a definition, ]egitimacy must be 
regarded as a variable quality that may exist in greater 
or lesser degree according to the state of diplomatic 
opinion. However intangible and difficult of measure-
ment, legitimacy is important to the United States, or to 
any country, because it can enhance a state's prestige, 
reduce the prestige of countries pursuing a contrary pol-
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icy, and induce support for desired policies and pro-
grams. 
The United Nations affects legitimacy in several ways. 
The most obvious is the adoption of a resolution that 
expresses collective approval or disapproval of particular 
"claims, policies, and behavior." 1 General Assembly 
resolutions supported by a large majority of the mem-
bership would confer substantial legitimacy, as we have 
defined the term. Even without the adoption of a resolu-
tion, the United Nations offers a forum in which to court 
the approval of other governments; and the process of 
explaining, defending, and building support for policies 
in the United Nations may itself contribute to legitimiza-
tion. The very fact of membership in the organization 
tends to legitimize intervention by one state in the affairs 
of another. As a member of the United Nations and a 
permanent member of the Security Council, for example, 
the United States can legitimately attempt to influence 
the outcome of any dispute anywhere that threatens in-
ternational peace and security. 
The third U.N. function -providing material support 
for American objectives - can be readi1y explained by 
illustrations. During the Korean war the United Nations 
provided military as well as moral support, and thus 
served the American objective of resisting communist 
expansion. The Congo operation 1960-1964 is another 
good example. By supplying troops, technical assistance 
and administrative personnel, the United Nations brought 
a degree of political stability to the Congo, minimized 
the chances of a direct Soviet-American military con-
frontation, and helped to prevent Soviet penetration of 
the Congo. On a smaller scale, U.N. observer teams in 
Greece, Lebanon, Pakistan, and elsewhere have helped 
bring a kind of stability to troubled areas, an accomplish-
ment clearly in the interest of the United States. 
1 Inis L. Claude, Jr., refers to this function as "collective legi-
timization," explained as a development by which "the political 
organs of the United Nations. most notably the General Assem-
bly, have come to be regarded and utilized by Member States as 
dispensers of impressively valuable international approval and 
disapproval of the claims, policies, and behavior of states." See 
Claude, "Implications and Questions for the Future," Interna-
tional Organization, Summer, 1965, p. 843; and Claude, The 
Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), 
pp. 73-103. 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
Much the same can be said of U.N. economic assist-
ance. Bilateral aid programs are undoubtedly more re-
sponsive to American control than the U.N. programs. 
But if American national interests are served by eco-
nomic development per se, and not merely by the politi-
cal strings attached, multilateral aid can be regarded as 
a form of material support for American objectives. 
Although this three-fold dassification of functions 
could be applied to the entire range of national inter-
ests affected by the United Nations, this discussion is 
concerned only with relations between the United States 
and the Soviet bloc. Specifically, cases to be cited are 
those in which the principal parties to the issue were 
communist on one side and non-communist on the other. 
Within the delimited subject area, however, the entire 
period 1946-1967 will be examined in order to evaluate 
the usefulness of the United Nations as an instrument 
for dealing with communist states. 
Review of Relevant Cases 
A detailed survey of United States cold war initia-
tives in the United Nations is precluded by space limi-
tation, but a summary of the relevant cases is presented 
in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The tables represent an essentially 
exhaustive list of cases discussed by the United Nations 
from 1946 to 1967 in which the following conditions 
were met; 1) the countries most directly concerned were 
TABLE 1. Cold War Issues Involving U.N. Legitimization Function 
Item 
Issue U.N. When Initiated 
Organ Discussed by U.S. 
Disarmament GA,SC 1946-1967 Yes 
Iran SC 1946 No 
Greece SC 1946 No 
GA 1947-1953 Yes 
Korea, unification GA 1947-1967 Yes 
Czech Coup SC 1948 No 
Berlin Blockade SC 1948 Yes 
Soviet Wives GA 1948 No 
Human Rights in 
Eastern Europe GA 1949-1950 No 
Soviet Treaty Violation GA 1949-1951 No 
Forced Labor ECOSOC, GA 1949-1951 Yes 
1953-1954 Yes 
Radio Jamming ECOSOC, GA 1950 Yes 
Prisoners of War 
Repatriation GA 1950, 1953 Yes 
Korea, military action SC.GA 1950-]953 Yes 
Formosa GA 1950 Yes 
German Reunification GA 1951 Yes 
Imprisonment of 
William Oatis ECOSOC, GA 1951-1952 Yes 
Germ Warfare 
Investigation SC,GA 1952-1953 Yes 
Korean Atrocities GA 1953 Yes 
Attack on U .S. Bomber SC 1954 Yes 
American Airmen GA 1954 Yes 
Formosa Straits SC 1955 No 
Hungary SC, GA 1956-1962 Yes 
Laos SC 1959 No 
Tibet GA 1959-1961, No 
1965 
Cuba SC 1962 Yes 
Gulf of Tonkin 
Incident SC 1964 Yes 
Vietnam War SC 1966 Yes 
Journal of, Volume Thirty-five, Nos. 2 and 3, 1968-1969 
TABLE 2. East-West Issues Involving the 
U.N. Negotiation Function 
U.N. When 
Issue Organ Discussed 
Disarmament GA,SC 1946-1967 
American Airmen GA 1954 
Formosa Straits SC 1955 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space GA 1958-1967 
Cuban Missile Crisis SC 1962 










TABLE 3. East-West Issues Involving the U.N. Material 
Support Function 
Item 
U.N. When Initiated 
Issue Organ Discussed by U .S. 
Greece GA 1947-1953 Yes 
Korea, unification GA 1947-1967 Yes 
Korea, military action SC, GA 1950-1953 Yes 
TABLE 4. Frequency of East-West Issues Involving the 













Number of Issues• 
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communist on one side and non-communist on the other, 
and 2) the United States strongly supported UN consid-
eration of the issue2 An examination of the three tables 
suggests that The United States has used the United Na-
tions in the East-West confrontation primarily as a 
means of legitimizing anti-communist policies and pos-
tures and only secondarily as a forum for negotiation or 
a source of material support. Table 1 also indicates, 
however, that use of the United Nations to legitimize 
anti-communist positions has declined markedly since 
the middle l 950's. 
As Table 4 shows, the legitimization of cold war pol-
icies reached a peak during the years 1948-1953 when 
the cold war was at its height. Given the imperatives of 
American foreign policy during that period, the United 
States had every incentive to use the United Nations in 
the cold war. And, given the large pro-Western major-
ity in the General Assembly, the United States had every 
expectation that its anti-communist positions would be 
endorsed. Since the mid-1950's, however, both of these 
conditions have changed. This also is reflected in Table 
4. Expanded membership and the growth of neutralism 
2 Some of the issues listed in Table 1, such as disarmament 
and the Korean War, embraced numerous sub-issues that are not 
listed. Some issues that appeared to serve two functions are listed 
in more than one table. 
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in the United Nations have made the world organiza-
tion less responsive to American leadership. The new 
states of Africa and Asia are far more interested in eco-
nomic development and eradicating colonialism than in 
cold war controversies. Voting on the Hungarian ques-
tion, shown in Table 5, illustrates from another perspec-
tive the growing reluctance of many UN members to 
support anti-communist resolutions in the Assembly. 
TABLE 5. General Assembly Voting on the Hungarian Question 
Year Yes No Abstain % Voting Yes 
1956* ..... .. ... 55 8 13 72 
1957 .. . . ....... 60 IO IO 75 
1958 ..... .... . . 54 IO 15 68 
1959 . .. ........ 53 IO 17 66 
1960 No Vote Taken 
1961 ........... 49 17 32 50 
1962 ........... 50 13 43 47 
*Several votes were taken in 1956. This one is selected as best 
representing the basic division of forces. 
The disarmament question provides an equally strik-
ing illustration of the change. Before 1958 the United 
States always voted on the winning side of disarmament 
questions, and the Soviet Union never did except on the 
few occasions when the two superpowers were in agree-
ment. From 1959 through 1965, however, the United 
States voted with the majority less often than the Soviet 
Union. Of thirty-four disarmament resolutions adopted 
by the General Assembly during this period, the United 
States supported only twenty-one while the Soviet Union 
voted for twenty-six. The two superpowers were in agree-
ment on seventeen of the thirty-four resolutions. 
Changed Conditions and Policies 
Conditions that made Soviet-American relations so 
hostile at an earlier period also have undergone change. 
The death of Stalin brought a new flexibility to Soviet 
policy; and the growth of a substantial industrial base 
and a managerial middle class with access to centers of 
political power have tempered the revolutionary zeal. 
The acquisition of a powerful nuclear arsenal and missile 
delivery systems has reduced somewhat the paranoid 
fears of capitalist encirclement which in past years con-
tributed to Soviet truculence in foreign affairs. East 
European satellite regimes have grown more independent 
( despite the 1968 setback in Czechoslovakia), while the 
rise of Communist China has forced the Soviet Union to 
bargain with other communist regimes for their support 
and opened the question of building bridges to the West 
to balance Chinese power. 
With the superpowers moving grudgingly toward de-
tente, the incentive to bring cold war issues to the United 
Nations decreased. Thus, from 1955 to 1967, the United 
States proposed for U.N. discussion only four new East-
West issues involving the legitimization function (Hun-
gary, Cuba, the Tonkin Gulf incident, and the Vietnam 
war) . All of these cases were placed before the Security 
Council rather than the General Assembly. 3 Two per-
• The Hungarian question was taken to the Assembly when the 
Soviet veto thwarted action in the Security Council. 
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ennials - disarmament and Korean unification - were 
carried over from the pre-1955 period; and three other 
East-West controversies (Formosa Straits, Tibet, and 
Laos) were brought to the United Nations upon the in-
itiative of other interested countries, although with the 
support of the United States. Of these nine issues, more-
over, only the Tibetan question fits the pattern of cal-
culated harassment characteristic of many initiatives of 
the earlier period. This issue was not proposed by the 
United States, and it was directed at China rather than 
the Soviet Union. 
Use in East West Negotiation 
In contrast to the frequent if declining American use 
of the legitimization function, the United Nations has 
never been heavily used by the United States to achieve 
a negotiated settlement of East-West questions. Of the 
hundreds of issues discussed by the Assembly or the Se-
curity Council from 1946 through 1967, only six may 
be regarded as serious attempts by the United States to 
reach accommodation with the Soviet bloc.• The results 
of these efforts have varied. In the case of American 
airmen held prisoner from the Korean war, Dag Ham-
marskjold's intercession with the Chinese government 
was widely acknowledged as an important factor in se-
curing their release." Likewise, U Thant's role as an in-
termediary in the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, 
was helpful if not indispensable in facilitating commu-
nication, and his call for mutual restraint gave Premier 
Khrushchev a face-saving excuse to stop Soviet vessels 
steaming toward Cuba with new missile shipments. 
In the field of arms control, U.N. processes have con-
tributed to Soviet-American agreement on a partial nu-
clear test-ban treaty, the establishment of a direct link 
("hot line") between Washington and Moscow, the ban-
ning of weapons of mass destruction from outer space, 
and a treaty to retard the proliferation of nuclear wea-
pons. A number of achievements in outer space co-
operation and the formulation of treaty law for outer 
space are also the product of U.N. negotiation. 
In only two of the relevant cases - the 1955 Formosa 
crisis and the Vietnam war - have U.N. efforts been un-
successful. The 1955 crisis subsided in the months fol-
lowing the Western appeal to the Security Council, but 
this had nothing to do with U.N. overtures - which Com-
munist China rejected. As for the Vietnam war, Ameri-
can efforts to promote a dialogue through the United 
Nations have been fruitless. U Thant's persistent at-
tempts to mediate may bear some causal relationship to 
• One may speculate that quiet negotiations behind the scenes 
have paved the way for Soviet-American agreement on matters 
that were not at the time the subject of formal U .N. debate. This 
was true of the Malik-Jessup talks in the spring of 1949 which 
ultimately led to the lifting of the Berlin Blockade. There is, 
however, no good evidence that many or indeed any other major 
East-West disputes have been settled as a result of off-the-record 
contacts at the United Nations. 
'For statements to this effect by Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles and U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., see U.S. 
Participation in the U .N ., Report by the President to the Congress 
for the year 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1956), pp. 49·50. 
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the initiation of current negotiations, but on this score 
the record is neither clear nor convincing. 
In appraising the usefulness of the United Nations as 
a negotiating forum in East-West controversies, one may 
distinguish issues like arms control and outer space, 
which are also of broad multilateral concern, from par-
ticular East-West disputes like the Cuban missile crisis. 
Judging from past experience, the capacity of the United 
Nations to facilitate agreement on the former is directly 
related to the general amicability of relations between 
the two countries. Arms control negotiations continued 
for many years without any agreement of significance. 
Only when a softening of attitudes took place, as the 
two countries moved toward a partial detente in the 
early 1960's, were limited agreements reached on the 
test-ban treaty, the hot line, and the banning of nuclear 
weapons in outer space. Cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of outer space was a product of the same period. The 
deterioration of Soviet-American relations that accom-
panied escalation of the Vietnam war in 1964 and 1965 
put a temporary halt to progress in both of these areas, 
but new agreements were forthcoming ( the 1966 and 
1967 outer space treaties and the 1968 nuclear non-
proliferation treaty) when Soviet-American relations re-
covered from the initial shock of escalation. 
Question of Usefulness in Crisis 
In appraising U.N. experience with particular East-
West disputes, the cases are too few to warrant much 
generalization. There does not seem to be any positive 
correlation between the general cordiality of great power 
relations and U.N. usefulness in facilitating settlement 
of particular disputes. If anything, the few episodes sug-
gest the contrary-that the United Nations will prove 
useful mainly in times of crisis when other channels of 
communication are insufficient. The limited contribu-
tion of the organization as a site for negotiations in the 
1949 Berlin crisis occurred when Soviet-American rela-
tions were tense and embittered by the blockade and 
other conflicts in Europe. The Cuban missile crisis came 
on the eve of detente, and perhaps contributed to the 
subsequent improvement of relations, but the U.N. ne-
gotiatory function was brought into play at the height 
of the crisis, when nuclear war seemed possible. In at-
tempts to deal with three Far Eastern problems - the 
American airmen, the Formosa Straits, and the Vietnam 
war- the United States turned to the world organization 
because other channels of communication with the ad-
versary were not open or had failed. 
The Cuban missile crisis suggests that the United Na-
tions also may be useful for East-West negotiations 
when a U.N. presence is being considered as a means of 
resolving crisis and negotiation is directed toward agreed 
U.N. action. Castro's insistence upon his sovereign right 
to refuse international inspection prevented a U.N. veri-
fication system from going into operation in Cuba. But 
the process of agreeing upon inspection involved the 
United States and the Soviet Union in extensive negotia-
tions at the United Nations and with U.N. officials. 
Journal of, Volume Thirty-five, Nos. 2 and 3, 1968-1969 
Material, Support in Confrontations 
In contrast to legitimization and negotiation, the U.N. 
material support function has been irrelevant to most 
aspects of the East-West confrontation. In the entire 
postwar period the United Nations has given material 
assistance to the West in just three conflicts directly in-
volving the United States or its allies with members of 
the Soviet bloc. One was the communist-supported re-
bellion in Greece; another was the question of Korean 
unification; the third was the Korean war itself. Each of 
these episodes originated in the early years of the or-
ganization when it still had a relatively small, Western-
oriented membership. 6 The post-Korea years have wit-
nessed several instances of communist military interven-
tion in the territory of neighboring countries, including 
Vietnam, Laos, Hungary, and Tibet- but not one of 
them has fit the pattern of the Korean war. 
lnspedions and ,Eledions 
Today there is oo shortage of potential uses for U.N. 
personnel and resources in support of American dealings 
with the communist world. An inspectorate for disarm-
ament agreements, supervision of a truce in Vietnam, 
conducting free elections in Korea or Germany, or aiding 
the war effort in Vietnam are a few of the possibilities. 
But elections and inspectorates require agreement among 
the parties concerned, and assistance in Vietnam de-
mands a large U.N. majority willing to back the anti-
communist policies of the United States. In the Cuban 
missile crisis the consensual basis for a U.N. inspector-
ate seemed about to materialize when Kennedy and 
Khrushchev agreed upon a role for U.N. monitoring, but 
U.N. action was frustrated by Castro's refusal to co-
operate. 
The hard fact is that the United Nations has never 
been a very effective action body in the East-West con-
frontation. Since Korea it has not been able to render 
even marginal assistance in men or material, except in 
situations like the Congo or the Middle East where the 
collision between the United States and the Soviet Union 
was ancillary to other issues. 
Evaluation of Purposes 
In dealings with communist countries over the past 
two decades, the United States has utilized the United 
Nations primarily for the purpose of legitimizing anti-
communist policies. Yet, since the mid-1950's, the world 
organization has become less useful for such a purpose. 
This is evident in the much less frequent American resort 
to the United Nations, the decline of Assembly voting 
support for the Western position on such issues as Hun-
gary and disarmament, and the growing American pref-
erence for the Security Council over the Assembly in 
such matters. 
In a broad perspective, if harassment of the Soviet 
• U.N. peacekeeping forces and observational teams, as well 
as U.N. discussion processes, have helped to avert potentially 
dangerous superpower confrontations in Africa, South Asia, and 
the Middle East. Such situations have arisen out of conflict be-
tween non-communist countries, however, and are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
149 
Union at the United Nations made negotiation more 
difficult, the decline of calculated harassment has created 
a better climate for negotiation and made the organiza-
tion more capable of functioning as a "center for har-
monizing the actions of nations." In this improved cli-
mate a limited agreement on arms control and the peace-
ful uses of outer space have been possible. Moreover, the 
decline of calculated harassment has been reciprocal. 
From 1962 through 1964 the Soviet bloc refrained from 
introducing any of its perennial anti-American peace-
mongering proposals for debate by the Assembly. In 
1965 this self-imposed moratorium was broken in the 
wake of United States intervention in the Dominican Re-
public and escalation of the Vietnam war. The Vietnam 
war has, indeed, retarded the growth of Soviet-American 
cooperation both in and out of the United Nations. It 
is remarkable that negotiation in such areas as arms con-
trol and outer space has continued to progress under 
U.N. auspices despite the war. The decline of legitimiza-
tion has also helped foster Soviet willingness to identify 
with a wider range of U.N. programs and activities. 
Zero Score for Fifteen Years 
U.N. material support of anti-communist policies, even 
more than legitimization, has gone into eclipse. Never a 
significant makeweight in the East-West power equation, 
the United Nations has scored a zero in this function for 
the past fifteen years and more. This development may 
also have its brighter side in a long range perspective, 
however. If the United Nations has lost its capacity to 
give material support to one superpower against another, 
a widening area of superpower consensus has permitted 
the world organization to commit personnel and re-
sources more readily when peace is threatened by dis-
putes among non-communist states. 
Developments of the past decade thus have increased 
the potentiality of the United Nations as an instrument 
for U.S. dealings with the Soviet bloc in some respects 
and decreased it in others. On the negative side, the or-
ganization has become less useful as a means of exerting 
political pressure on the Soviet Union. On the positive 
side, its negotiatory functions have acquired greater sig-
nificance, particularly in matters of widespread interna-
tional concern. Considering the rather substantial coer-
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cive capabilities of the United States, and the crying need 
for diplomatic bridges between East and West, the 
change may in the long run prove to be a very favorable 
trade-off for the United States. 
The future role of the United Nations in American 
foreign policy will of course hinge upon the willingness 
of the United States to exploit its real potentialities. 
There is a danger that developments of the past decade 
may cause the United States to lose confidence in an or-
ganization that no longer automatically takes the Ameri-
man side in the cold war. The "crisis of confidence" of 
the late 1950's and early 1960's, with its widespread 
calls for reappraisal of the U.N. role in American policy, 
indicated that some loss of confidence had occurred in 
official as well as private circles. Since that time govern-
ment officials have been more inclined than before to re-
fer openly to the United Nations as an instrument of 
policy or as one tool among many for accomplishing 
American objectives. American financial support of U.N. 
programs has not fallen off, however, and participation 
in nearly all of its activities remains at a high level. 
President Kennedy enthusiastically referred to the United 
Nations as "a framework within which we can pursue the 
highest goal of American foreign policy: a world com-
munity of independent nations living together in free 
association and at peace with each other." 7 More recently 
President Johnson called the United Nations "the best 
system yet devised for sovereign nations to work together 
with equality and self respect." 8 If this official attitude 
persists, the decline of the United Nations as an anti-
communist instrument may ultimately increase the pros-
pect of a U.N. contribution to the larger goals of Ameri-
can policy. 
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